University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
US Government Documents related to
Indigenous Nations

Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special
Collections

1-5-1903

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
United States Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/indigenous-gov-docs
Part of the American Politics Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons,
Indigenous Studies Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Native American Studies Commons, and the
United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 US 553 (1903). https://commons.und.edu/indigenous-gov-docs/172/.

This Court Case is brought to you for free and open access by the Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special
Collections at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in US Government Documents related
to Indigenous Nations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

LONE WOLF v. HITCHCOCK.
Syllabus.

vouz judgments, provisions of the Constitution of the United
States which would have been available if pleaded or otherwise
presented in the state courts as a defence m the proceedings
in the original action to defeat the recovery of a valid judgment,
cannot, when the opportunity has not been availed of and the
judgment has become a finality, be resorted to as establishing
that in fact the judgment possessed no binding force or efficacy
whatever.
Judgment affirmed.

LONE WOLF v. HITOHCOCK.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.
No. 275. Argued October 23, 1902.-Decided January 5,1903.
The provisions in article 12 of the Medicine Lodge treaty of 1867 with the
Kiowa and Comanche Indians to the effect that no treaty for the cession
of any part of the reservation therein described, which may be held in
common, shall be of any force or validity as against the Indians unless
executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the adult male Indians
occupying the same, cannot be adjudged to materially limit and qualify
the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency,
when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the
tribal lands, of all power to act if the assent of three fourths of all the
male Indians could not be obtained. Congress has always exercised
plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians-and the power
has always been deemed a political- one not subject to. be controlled-by
the courts.
In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over treaties with
the Indians, and Indian tribal property, even if a subsequent agreement
or treaty purporting to be signed by three fourths of all the male Indians
was not signed and amendments to such subsequent treaty were not submitted to the Indians, as all these matters were solely within the domain
of the legislative authority, the action of Congress is conclusive upon the
courts.
As the act of June 6, 1900, as to the disposition of these lands was enacted at a
time when the tribal relations between the confederated tribes of the Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches still existed, and that statute and the statutes
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supplementary thereto, dealt with the disposition of tribal property and
purported to give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not
allotted among the Indians or reserved for their benefit, such legislation was constitutional and this court will presume that Congress acted
in perfect good faith and exercised its best judgment in the premises, and
as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of
such legislation.

IN 1867 a treaty was concluded with the Kiowa and Comanche tribes of Indians, and such other friendly tribes as might
be united with, them, setting apart a reservation for the use of
such Indians. By a separate treaty the Apache tribe of Indians
-was incorporated with the two former-naniei, and became entitled to share in the benefits of the reservation. 15 Stat. 581,
589.
The first named treaty is usually called the Medicine Lodge
treaty By the sixth article thereof it was provided that heads
of families might select a tract of land within the reservation,
not exceeding 320 acres in extent, which should thereafter cease
to be held in common, and should be for the exclusive possession of the- Indian making the selection, so long as he or his
family might continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article of the treaty was as follows
"Article 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part
-of the reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians,
unless executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the
adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the
tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive, without Ins consent, any individual member of the tribe
of his rights to any tract of land selected by hun as provided
in article III (VI) of this treaty"
The three tribes settled under the treaties upon the described
land. On October 6, 1892, 456 male adult members of the
confederated tribes signed, with three commissioners representing tb6 United States, an agreement concerning the reservation.
The Indian ,igent, in a certificate appended to tiw- agroe.nent,
represented that there were then 562 male adult, m the three
tribes. Senate Ex. Doe. No. 27, 52d Congress, secodm session,
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page 17. Four hundred and fifty-six male adults therefore
constituted more than three fourths of the certified number of
total male adults in the three tribes. In form the agreement
was a proposed treaty, the terms of which, in substance, provided for a surrender to the United States of the rights of the
tribes m the -reservation, for allotments out of such lands to the
Indians in severalty, the fee simple title to be conveyed to the
allottees or -theirheirs after the expiration of twenty-five years,
and the payment or setting apart for the benefit of the tribes
of two million dollars as the consideration for the surplus of
land over and above the allotments which might be made to
the Indians. It was provided that sundry named friends of the
Indians (among such persons being the Indian agent and an
army officer)" should each be entitled to all the benefits, in
land only, conferred under this agreement, the same as if
members of said tribes." Eliminating 350,000 acres of mountainous land, the quantity of surplus lands, suitable for farming
and grazing purposes was estimated at 2,150,000 acres. Concerning the payment to be made for these surplus lands, the
commission, in their report to the President announcing the
termination of the negotiations, said (Senate Ex. Doe. -No.17,
second session, 52d Congress)
"In this connection it is proper to add that the commission
agreed with the Indians to incorporate the following in their
report, which is now done
"The Indians upon this reservation seem to believe (but
whether from an exercise of their own judgment or-from the
advice of others the commission cannot determine) that their
surplus land is worth two and one half million dollars, and
Congress may be induced to give them that much for it. Therefore, in compliance with their request, we report that they desire to be heard through an attorney and a delegation to
Washington upon that question, the agreement signed, however, to be effective upon ratification, no matter what Congress
may do with their appeal for the extra half million dollars."
In transmitting the agreement to the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs said.
"The price paid, -while considerably in excess of that paid
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to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, seems to be fair and reasonable, both to the government and the Indians, the land being
doubtless of better quality than that in the Cheyenne and
Arapahoe reservation."
Attention was directed to the provision in the agreement in
favor of the Indian agent and an army officer, and it was suggested that to permit them to avail thereof would establish a
bad precedent.
Soon after the signing of the foregoing agreement it was
claimed by the Indians that their assent had been obtained by
fraudulent misrepresentations of its terms by the interpreters,
and it was asserted that the agreement should not be held binding upon the tribes because three fourths of the adult male
members had not assented thereto, as was required by the
twelfth article of the Medicine Lodge treaty
Obviously, in consequence of the policy embodied in section 2079 of the Revised Statutes, departing from the former
custom of dealing with Indian affairs by treaty and providing
for legislative action on such subjects, various bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress designed to give legal effect
to the agreement made by the Indians in 1892. These bills
were referred to the proper committees, and before such committees the Indians presented their objections to the propriety
of giving effect to the agreement. (H.R. Doc. No. 431, 55th
Congress, second session.) In 1898 the Committee on Indian
Affairs of the House of Representatives unanimously reported
a bill for the execution of the agreement made with the Indians. The report of the committee recited that a favorable
conclusion had been reached by the committee "after the
fullest hearings from delegations of the Indian tribes and all
parties at interest." (H. R. Doc. No. 4119, first session, 56th
Congress, p. 5.)
The bill thus reported did not exactly conform to the agreement as signed by the Indians. It modified the agreement
by changing the time for making the allotments, and it also
provided that the proceeds of the surplus lands remaining after
allotments to the Indians should be held to await the judicial
decision of a claim asserted by the Choctaw and Chickasaw
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tribes of Indians to the surplus lands. This claim was based
upon a treaty made in 1866, by which the two tribes ceded the
reservation in question, it being contended that the lands were
impressed with a trust in favor of the ceding tribes, and that
whenever the reservation was abandoned, so much of it as was
not allotted to the confederated Indians of the Comanche,
]{iowa and Apache tribes reverted. to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.
The bill just referred to passed the House of Representatives
on May 16, 1898. (31st Cong. Rec. p. 4947.) When the bill
reached the Senate that body, on January 25, 1899, adopted a
resolution calling upon the Secretary of the Interior for information as to whether the signatures attached to the agreement
comprised three fourths of the male adults of the tribes. In
response the Secretary of the Interior informed the Senate,
under date of January 28, 1899, that the records of the department "failed to show a census of these Indians for the year
1892," but that "from a roll used in making a payment to them
in January and February, 1893, it appeared that there were
725 males over eighteen years of age, of whom 639 were twentyone years and over" The Secretary further called attention
to the fact that by the agreement of 1892 a right of selection
was conferred upon each member of the tribes over eighteen
years of age, and observed
"If 18 years and over be held to be the legal age of those
who were authorized to sign the agreement, the number of persons who actually signed was 87 less than three fourths of the
adult male membership of the tribes, and if 21 years be held
to be the minimum age, then 23 less than three fourths signed
the agreement. In either event, less than three fourths of the
male adults appear to have so signed."
With this information before it the bill was favorably reported by the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate, but
did not pass that body
At the first session of the following Congress (the Fiftysixth) bills were introduced in both the Senate and House-of
Representatives substantially like that which has just been noticed. (Senate, 1352, H. R. 905.)
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In the meanwhile, about October, 1899, the Indians had, at
a general council at which 571 male adults of the tribes purported to be present, protested against the execution of the
provisions of the agreement of 1892, and adopted a memorial
to Congress, praying that that body should not give effect to
the agreement. This memorial was forwarded to the Secretary
of the Interior by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with
lengthy comments, pointing out the fact that the Indians claimed
that their signatures to the agreement bad been procured by
fraud and that the legal number of Indians had not signed the
agreement, and that the previous bills and bills then pending
.contemplated modification of the agreement in important particulars without the consent of the Indians. This communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, together with the
memorial of the Indians, were transmitted by the Secretary of
the Interior to Congress. (Senate Doe. No. 76, H. R. Doe.
No. 333, first session, Fifty-sixth Congress.) Attention was
called to the fact that although by the agreement of October 6,
1892, one half of each allotment was contemplated to be agricultural land, there was only-sufficient agricultural land in the
entire reservation to average thnty acres per Indian. After
setting out the charges of fraud and complaints respecting the
proposed amendments designed to be made to the agreement,
as above stated, particular complaint was made of the provision in the agreement of 1892 as to allotments in severalty
among the Indians of lands for agricultural purposes. After
reciting that the tribal lands were not adapted to such purposes, but were suitable for grazmg, the memorial proceeded as
follows
"We submit that the provision for lands to be allotted to us
under this treaty are insufficient, because it is evident we cannot, on account of the climate of our section, which renders the
maturity of crops uncertain, become a successful farming community, that we, or whoever else occupies these lands, will
have to depend upon the cattle industry for revenue and support. And we therefore pray, if we cannot be granted the
-privilege of keeping our reservation under the treaty made with
us in 1868, and known as the Medicine Lodge treaty, that au-
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thority be granted for the consideration of a new treaty that
will make the allowance of land to be allotted to us sufficient for us to graze upon it enough stock cattle, the increase
from which we can market for support of ourselves and
families"'
With the papers just referred to before it, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, in February, 1900, favorably reported
a bill to give effect to the agreement of 1892.
On January 19, 1900, an act was passed by the Senate, entitled "An act to ratify an agreement made with the Indians
of the Fort Hall Indian reservation in Idaho, and making an
appropriation to carry the same. into effect." In February,
1900, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, having before it
the memorial of the Indians transmitted by the Secretary of
the Interior, and also having for consideration the Senate bill
just alluded to, reported that bill back to the House favorably,
with certain amendments. (H. R. Doc. No. 419, 56th Congress, first session.) One of such amendments consisted in adding to the bill in question, as section 6, a provision to execute
the agreement made with the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache
Indians in 1892. Although the bill thus reported eiibodied
the execution of the agreement last referred to, the title of the
bill was not changed, and consequently referred only to the
execution of the agreement made with the Indians of the Fort
Hall reservation in Idaho. The provisions thus embodied in
section 6 of the bill in question substantially conformed to those
contained in the bill which had previously, passed the House,
except that the previous enactment on thi subject was changed
so as to do away with the necessity for making to each Indian
one half of his allotment in agricultural land and the other half
in grazing land. In addition a clause was inserted in the bill
providing for the setting apart of a large amount of grazing
land to be used in common by the Indians. The provision in
question was as follows
"That in addition to the allotment of lands to said Indians
as provided for in this agreement, the Secretary of the Interior
shall set aside for the use in common for said Indian tribes four
hundred and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands, to be
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selected by the Secretary of the Interior, either in one or more
tracts as will best subserve the interest of said Indians."
The provision of the agreement in favor of the'Indian agent
and army officer was also eliminated.
The bill, moreover, exempted the money consideration for
the surplus lands from all claims for Indian depredations, and
expressly .provided that in the event the claim of the Choctaws
and Chickasaws was ultimately sustained, the consideration referred to should be subject to the further action of Congress.
In this bill as in previous ones provision was made for allotments
to the Indians, the opening of the surplus land for settlement,
etc. The bill became a law by concurrence of the Senate in
the amendments adopted by the House as just stated.
Thereafter, by acts approved on January 4,1901, 31 Stat. 727,
c. 8, March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1078i c. 832, and March 3, 1901,
31 Stat. 1093, c. 846, authority was given to extend the time
for making allotments and opening of the surplus land for settlement for a period not exceeding eight months from December 6, 1900 , appropriations were made for surveys in connection
with allotments and setting apart of grazing lands, and authority was conferred to establish counties and county seats,
townsites, etc., and proclaim the surplus lands open for settlement by white people.
On June 6, 1901, a bill was filed on the equity side of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, wherein Lone Wolf
(one of the appellants herein) was named as complainant, suing
for himself as well as for all other members of the ednfederated
tribes of the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indians, residing
in the Territory of Oklahoma. The present appellees (the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and
the Commissioner of the General Land Office) were made respondents to the bill. Subsequently, by an aniendment to the
bill, members of the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache tribes were
joined with Lone Wolf as parties complainant.
The bill recited the establishing and occupancy of the reservation in Oklahoma by the confederated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches, the signing of the agreement of October 6,
1892, and the subsequent proceedings which have been detailed,
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culminating in the passage of the act of June 6, 1900, and the
acts of Congress supplemeniary to said act. In substance it
was further charged in the bill that the agreement had not been
signed as required by the M dicme Lodge tieaty, that is, by
three fourths of the male adult members of the tribe, and that
the signatures thereto had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment, similar to those recited in the
memorial signed at the 1899 council. In addition to the grievance- previously stated in the memorial, the charge was made
that the interpreters falsely represented, when the said treaty
was being considered by the Indians, that the treaty provided
"for the sale of their surplus lands at some time in the future
at the price of $2.50 per acre," whereas, in truth and in fact,
"by the terms of said treaty, only $1.00 an acre is allowed for
said surplus lands," which sum, it was charged, was an amount
far below the real value of said lands. It was alsd averred
that portions of the signed agreement had been changed by
Congress without submitting such changes to the Indians for
their consideration. Based upon the foregoing allegations, it
was alleged that so much of said act of Congress of June 6,
1900, and so much of said acts supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof as provided for the taking effect of said agreement,
the allotment of certain lands mentioned therein to members
of said Indian tribes, the surveying, laying out, and platting
townsites and locating county seats on said lands, and the ced'ing to the United States -andthe opening to settlement by white
men of two million acres of gaid lands, were enacted in violation of the property rights of the said Kiowa; Comanche and
Apache Indians, and if carried into effect would deprive said
Indians of their lands without due process of law, and that said
parts of said acts were contrary to the Constitution of the United
states, and were void, and conferred no right, power or duty upon
the respondents to do or perform any of the acts or things en,joined or required-by the acts of Congress in question. Alleging
the intention of the rspondents to carry into effect the aforesaid.
claimed unconstitutional and void acts,,and asking di~cotAery by
answers to interrogatories propounded to the respondents, the
allowance of a temporary restraining order, and a final decree
VOL. CLXxxVn- -,36
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awarding a perpetual injunction was prayed, to restrain the comnssion by the respondents of the alleged unlawful acts by them
threatened to be done. General relief was also prayed.
On January 6, 1901, a rule to show cause why a temporary
injunction should not be granted was issued. In response to
this rule an affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior was filed,
in which in substance it was averred that the complainant (Lone
Wolf) and his wife and daughter had selected allotments under
the act of June 6, 1900, and the same had been approved by
the Secretary of the Interior and that all other members of
the tribes, excepting twelve, had also accepted and retained
allotments in severalty, and that the greater part thereof had
been approved before the bringing of this suit. It was also
averred that the 480,000 acres of grazing land provided to be
set apart, in the act of June 6, 1900, for-the use by the Indians
m common, had been so set apart prior to the institution of the
suit, "with the approval of a council composed of chiefs and
headmen of said Indians." Thereupon an affidavit verified by
Lone Wolf -was filed, in which in effect he denied that, he had
accepted an allotment of lands under the act of June 6, 1900,
and the acts supplementary to and amendatory thereof. Thereafter, on June 17, 1901, leave was given to amend the bill and
the same was amended, as heretofore stated, by adding additional parties complainant and by providing a sibstituted first
paragraph of the bill, in which was set forth, among other
things, that the three tribes, at a general council held on June 7,
1901, had voted to institute all legal and other proceedings necessary to be taken, to prevent the carrying into effect of the legislation complained of.
The Supreme Court of the District on June 21, 1901, denied
the application for a temporary injunction. The cause was
thereafter submitted to the court on a demurrer to the bill as
amended. The demurrer was sustained, and the complainants
electing not to plead further, on June 26, 1901, a decree was
entered'in favor of the respondents. An appeal was thereupon
taken to the -Court of Appeals of the District. While this appeal was pending, the President issued a proclamation, dated
July 4, 1901; (32 Stat. Appx. Proclamations, 11,) in which it was
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ordered that the surplus lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa
and Apache and other tribes of Indians should be opened to,
entry and settlement on August 6, 1901. Among other things,
it was recited in the proclamation that aUl the conditions required by law to be performed prior to the opening of the lands
to settlement and entry had been performed. It was also therein
recited that, in pursuance of the act of Congress ratifying the
agreement, allotments of land in severalty had been regularly
made to each member of the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache
tribes of Indians, the lands occupied by religious societies or
other organizations for religious or educational work among
the Indians had-been regularly allotted and confirmed to such
societies and organizations, respectively; and the Secretary of
the Interior, out of the lands ceded by the agreement, had
regularly selected and set aside for the use in. common for
said Comanche, Kiowa and Apache tribes of Indians, four
hundred and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands.
The .Cort of Appeals (without passing on a motion which
had been made to dismiss the appeal) affirmed the decree of the
court below, and overruled a motion for.reargument. 19 App.
D. C. 315. An appeal was allowed, and the decree.of affirmance is now here for review
.X" William X Smtnger and Mr Eampton L. Cwrson for
appellants.
q .Ass-tantAttorney Genera2 Van Devanter for appellee.
R. JusTrOE WHiTE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court.
By the sixth article of the first of the two treaties referred
to in the preceding statement, proclaimed on August 25, 1868,
15 Stat. 581, it was. provided that heads of families of the,
tribes affected by the treaty might select, within the reservation,
a tract of land of not exceeding 320 acres in extent, which
should thereafter cease to be held in common, and should be
for the exclusive possession of the Indian making the selection,
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so long as he or his family might continue to cultivate the land.
The twelfth article reads as follows
"Article 12. No treaty for the *cessionof any portion or part
of the reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the said
Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three fourths
of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession
by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as
to deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the
tribe of his rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in article III (VI) of this treaty"
The appellants base their right to relief on the proposition
that by the effect of the article just quoted the confederated
tribes of Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches were vested with an
interest in the lands held in common within the reservation,
which interest could not be divested by Congress in any other
mode than that specified in the said twelfth article, and that as
a result of the said stipulation the interest of the Indians in the
common lands fell within the protection of the Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution of the United States, and such interest-indirectly at least-came under the control of the judicial
branch of the government. We are unable to yield our assent
to this view
The contention m effect ignores the status of the contracting
Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue
to bear towards the government of the United States. To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation
of the treaty was to materialy limit and qualify the controlling
authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of
-the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency,
when~the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal
of the tribal lands, of all power to act, if the assent of the
Indians could not be obtained.
Now, it is true that in decisions of thiscourt, the Indian right
of occupancy of tribal lands, whether declared in a treaty or
'otherwise created, has been stated to be sacred, or, as sometimes expressed, as sacred as the fee of the United States in the
same lands. Joinson v .ochtosh, (1823) 8 Wheat. 543, 574,
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Chero ee .Ntion v Georgm, (1831) 5 Pet. 1, 48, TWorcester v
Georgsa, (1832) 6 Pet. 515, 581, United States v Cook, (1813)
19 Wall. 591, 592, Leavenworth &c. R. 1. Co. v. United
States, (1875) 92 U. S. 733, 755, Beecher v Tletherly, (1877)
95 U. S. 517, 525. But in none of these cases was there involved a controversy between Indians and the government
respecting the power of Congress to administer the property of
the Indians. The questions considered in the cases referred to,
which either directly or indirectly had relation to the nature
of the property rights of the. Indians, concerned the character
and extent of such rights as respected States or individuals. In
one of the cited cases it was clearly pointed out that Congress
possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians,
by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests,
and that such authority might be implied, even though opposed
to the strict letter of a .treaty with the Indians. Thus, in
Beecher v. Wetlierby, 95 U. S. 517, discussing the claim that
there had been a prior reservation of land by treaty to the use
of a certain tribe of Indians, the court said (p. 525)
"But the right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy The fee was in the United States, subject to that
right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose.
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and
could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians, that occupancy
could only be interfered with or determined by the United
States. It is to be presumed that in this matter the United
States would be gove-ned by such considerations of justice as
would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be that as it may, the propriety or
justice of their action towards the Indians with respect to their
lands is a question of governmental policy, and is not a matter
open to discussion in a controversy between third parties,
neither of whom derives title from the Indians."
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government. Until the year 1871 the policy was pursued of dealing with the
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Indian tribes by means of treaties, and, of course, a moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing
the stipulations entered into on its behalf. But, as with treaties made with foreign nations, Chnese Ecxluswzn Case, 130 U.
S. 581, 600, the legislative power might pass laws in conflict
with treaties made with the Indians. Thomas v Gay, 169 U.
S. 264, 270, Ward v Race Horse, 163 U S. 504, 511, 8,paiding
v Chandler,160 U S. 394, 405, Xissourz, Kansas & Texas
.Ry. Co. v Roberts, 152 U. S. 114, 117, The Cherokee Tobacco,
11 Wall. 616.
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian
treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only
when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may
demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. When, therefore, treaties were
entered into between the United States and. a tribe of Indians
it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in
Congress, and' that in a contingency such _power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians. In United States v Eagama, (1885) 118 U. S. 375,
speaking of the Indians, the court said (p. 382)
"After an experience of a hundred years of- the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon a
new departure-to govern them by acts cif Congress. This is
seen in the act of March 3, 1871, embodied in § 2079 of the
Revised Statutes 'No Indian nation or tribe, within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States may contract by treaty, but no obligation of any
treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.'"
In upholding the validity of an act of Congress which conferred jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States for
certain crimes committed on an Indian reservation within a
State, the court said (p. 383)

LONE WOLF v. HITCHCOCK.
Opimon of the Court.

"It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they axe found are often their
deadliest enemies. Fxom their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
government with -them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive
and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen.
"The power of the general government over these remnants
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers,
is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government,
because it never has -existed anywhere else, because the theatre
of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone
can enforce its laws on all the tribes."
That Indians who had not been fully emancipated from the
control and protection of the United States are subject, at
least so far as the tribal lands were concerned, to be controlled
by direct legislation of Congress, is also declared in Choctaw
.Nationv United States, 119 U. S. 1, 27, and Stephens v Cierokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 483.
In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over
treaties -with the Indians and Indian tribal property, we may
not specially consider the contentions pressed upon our notice
that the signing by the Indians of the agreement of October 6,
1892, was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment, that the requisite three fourths of adult male Indians
had not signed, as required by the twelfth article of the treaty
of 1867, and that the treaty as signed had been amended by
Congress without submitting such amendments to the action
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of the Indians, since all these matters, in any event, were solely
within the, domain of the legislative authority and its action is
coniblusive upon the courts.
The act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of m the bill,
was enacted at a time when the tribal relations between the
confederated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches and.Apaches still"
-existed, and that statute and the statutes supplementary thereto.
dealt with the disposition of tribal property and purported to
give an adequate. consideration forthe surplus lands not allotted
among the Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the
controversy which this case presents is concluded by. the decision in Cherokee Yatiom v Hitcheock, 187 U. S. 294, decided at
this term, where it was held that full administrative power
was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property. In
effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an
exercise of such power, a mere. change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those who, as
we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the government. We must .presume- that Congress acted in perfect
good faith in-the dealings with the' Indians of which complaint
is made, and that the legislative branch of the government
exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any event, as
Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the
epactment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which
*6 do not wish tobe understood as implying, by the use made
by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal
to that body for redress and not to the courts. The legislation
in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the bill
was therefore rightly sustained.
The motion to dismiss does not challenge jurisdiction over
the-'subject matter. Without expressly referring to fhe propositions of fact upon which it proceeds, suffice it to say that
we think it need not be further adverted to, since, for the
reasons previously given and the nature of the controversy, we
think the decree below should be 1Affwwd.
19P..
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concurs in the result.

